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a. Non-concur, based on our belief that blanket requirements are not realistic or achievable, and then most likely be voted down by the remaining members.

b. Concur, but add at the end of the second line on page 3, the following: "The SOIC may waive the requirement for defensive security briefings of Unofficial travelers and the requirement for an annual reminder of SCI foreign travel and assignment policy when operational considerations preclude timely compliance.

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DCID 1/7

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Chief, Policy Branch, PPG

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

C/PPG

1/28/83

D

2.

DD/P&M

28 JAN 1983

1/28

S

3.

DD/SEC

31 JAN 1983

1/31/83

Jh

4.

D/SEC

31 JAN 1983

5.

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Originator to 4:

These are the revised drafts of DCID 1/7 (Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information) and DCID 1/20 (Security Policy....Travel/Assignment of those with SCI access).

Most of NSA's suggested revisions to both documents were voted down.

Paragraph 6e of DCID 1/7 was revised essentially in conformance with CIA's recommendation. It is now, in our opinion, acceptable. I recommend that you Concur on DCID 1/7.

DCID 1/20 is another matter. The other SECOM members prevailed in their insistence that all unofficial travelers to criteria countries receive a defensive security briefing -- not just those with substantive SCI access. SECOM members also insist on Annual Rebriefings. This latter requirement places a heavy burden, particularly on Chiefs of Station/Base, and is not realistic.

Two options suggest themselves for DCID 1/20:

Continued

5.

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

FORM 1-79

610

USE PREVIOUS EDITION

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